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Spiritually Ours, Factually Yours: Karelia and Russia in Finnish 
Public Consciousness
Jussi P. Laine and Martin Van der VeLde
Abstract
Based on an analysis of the leading Finnish newspaper, Hels-
ingin Sanomat, this paper explores Finnish attitudes towards 
and understandings of Russia. It pays special attention to the 
so-called Karelia Question and the way it has shaped public 
discussion in Finland. The article seeks to investigate human 
signifying practices in the region’s specific social and cultural 
circumstances and explains meaning-making as a social prac-
tice. It evaluates how public opinion, as expressed in the let-
ters page of the newspaper, has evolved and been affected by 
the broader changes that have occurred at the border. There 
are clear changes over time, both in a quantitative and qualita-
tive sense. This may be summarised as representing a trend 
of general fading into history, but also as a more cyclical effect 
and as the interplay between bilateral relations and broader 
geopolitical changes. 
Karelia Question; Public opinion; Newspaper; Finland; Russia; 
Social semiotics
Zusammenfassung
Spiritually Ours, Factually Yours: Karelien und Russland im 
finnischen öffentlichen Bewusstsein
Diese Veröffentlichung erforscht auf der Grundlage einer Un-
tersuchung der führenden finnischen Tageszeitung Helsingin 
Sanomat die Einstellungen und das Verständnis der Finnen zu 
Russland. Sie beschäftigt sich besonders mit der sogenannten 
Karelien-Frage und die Art und Weise, wie diese die öffentliche 
Diskussion in Finnland geprägt hat. Der Artikel versucht, mei-
nungsbildende Verhaltensweisen in den spezifischen sozialen 
und kulturellen Verhältnissen zu untersuchen und erläutert die 
Meinungsbildung als gesellschaftliches Verhalten. Er bewertet, 
wie sich die öffentliche Meinung, wie sie sich auf der Leserbrief-
seite der Zeitung ausdrückt, entwickelt hat und von den größe-
ren Veränderungen beeinflusst worden ist, die an der Grenze 
stattgefunden haben. Es gibt im Laufe der Zeit eindeutige Ver-
änderungen sowohl in quantitativem als auch qualitativen Sinn. 
Dies lässt sich als Darstellung eines Trends zum allgemeinen 
Verschwinden in der Geschichte zusammenfassen, aber auch 
als periodisch auftretender Effekt und als Zusammenspiel zwi-
schen bilateralen Beziehungen und allgemeineren geopoliti-
scher Veränderungen. 
Karelien-Frage; öffentliche Meinung; Tageszeitung; Finnland; 
Russland; Sozialsemiotik
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Introduction
The Karelia Question refers to a dispute 
in Finland over whether Finland should 
attempt to regain sovereignty over the 
territories that it was forced to cede to 
the Soviet Union after the Continuation 
War,1 fought during the Second World 
War. Officially, there is no question, as 
both governments agree that no open ter-
ritorial dispute exists between the coun-
tries; however, the reacquisition of ceded 
territories and a potential adjustment of 
the borderline remain a topic that con-
tinues to arouse strong feelings in Finn-
ish public debate. The Russian leadership 
has indicated on several occasions that it 
has no intention of participating in dis-
cussions concerning the matter, while 
Finland’s official stance is that the bor-
ders may be changed through peaceful 
negotiation, but that there is no need to 
open talks, as Russia has shown no inten-
tion of discussing this (Fig. 1). 
Although the case of Karelia may be 
seen in retrospect as a positive case of a 
mutual rediscovery and exploitation of 
historical commonalities, common land-
scapes, and regional traditions (Scott 
2013, p. 88), it has not been and is not 
immune to the wider fluctuations of Finn-
ish/EU–Russian relations. This paper 
goes behind the mere historical and in-
ternational relations perspectives and as-
sumes a more semiotic angle on opinion 
pieces published in the Finnish national 
newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat (HS), ana-
lysing how the argumentation behind the 
Karelia Question has evolved from 1990 
to 2015 and how the image of Karelia 
has been formed. It argues that while the 
Finnish relation with Russia have become 
clearly less loaded than what they were 
earlier with the Soviet Union, they still 
cannot be reduced to mere forms of prag-
matism, interdependencies or the simple 
equations between supply and demand, 
but there are also subtler discursive and 
symbolic forces at play (cf. Paasi 1996; 
Laine 2015).
1 The Continuation War involved hostilities between 
Finland and the Soviet Union between 1941 and 
1944. It began shortly after the end of the Winter War, 
during which the Soviet Union had attempted to invade 
Finland.
During the study period significant chang-
es have occurred at the Finnish-Russian 
interface. In 1990 the world was still di-
vided into two camps and the 1948 Agree-
ment of Friendship, Cooperation and Mu-
tual Assistance between Finland and the 
Soviet Union was in effect. However, in the 
following year the Soviet Union collapsed, 
the Cold War came to an end, and Finland 
was quick to apply for European Union 
(EU) membership. When Finland then 
joined in 1995, previously bilateral bor-
der issues were suddenly framed as part 
of broader EU-Russia relations. All these 
shifts are very clearly reflected in public 
opinion as expressed in the newspaper. 
This article investigates the develop-
ment of the debate in these quite spe-
cific social and cultural circumstances 
and aims for a better understanding of 
the development of public opinion vis-
à-vis broader geopolitical changes and 
international relations. We understand 
meaning-making as a social practice 
bound to the context in which it occurs, 
whereby tying our analysis on a histori-
cal newspaper record helps us to situate 
the debate in the context it originally 
took place in, diminishing thus the risk 
of hindsight bias. Following this intro-
duction we will describe the role Karelia 
plays in Finnish-Russian relations, and 
newspapers’ function as a platform for 
public debate. Building on the material 
collected from Helsingin Sanomat, the 
next chapter will describe the develop-
ment of the Karelia Question and shed 
light on the role the newspaper has 
played in this process. The collected 
material is discussed by connecting the 
changes in the foci of the debate with 
the broader changes that have occurred 
at the border. The second empirical sec-
tion, before the conclusions, uses read-
ers’ contributions to analyse the devel-
opment of public opinion concerning the 
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Karelia Question. The task here is to look 
beyond the specific texts to the systems 
of functional distinction operating within 
them and to identify the underlying con-
ventions and significant differences. 
Karelia in Transition
Finland’s post-Second World War rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union, and more 
recently with Russia, has been both close 
and distant – at times concurrently (Laine 
2015). It has been shaped by a common 
history, Cold War realities, pragmatism, 
interdependencies, and the lessons 
learned from devastating armed con-
flicts. A particularly long lasting dispute 
has concerned the contested territory of 
Karelia, a region that extends across the 
border between Finland and Russia. In 
its historical development Karelia may be 
understood as a zone of transition, politi-
co-religious division and, most recently, of 
a Finnish–Russian rapprochement and re-
evaluation of common experience (Scott 
2013, p. 88). 
The two countries in question view 
the region somewhat differently. For 
Finland – or for some Finns, to be more 
precise – Karelia plays an important role 
as a cradle of the nation, and even as a 
holy territory, and hence as central to any 
understanding of the essence of Finnish-
ness (cf. Browning & Joenniemi 2014, 
p. 1). For Russians Karelia has a clearly 
less emotional place. Instead, Russia has 
traditionally drawn a close link between 
territory and security that has seen con-
trol of Karelia as very important for impe-
rial thinking, geostrategic reasoning, and 
territorial defence (Hirsch 2005; Kang-
aspuro 2000; Liikanen 1999; cf. Laine 
2002). 
Although Finland gained independence 
in 1917, there was a general dissatisfac-
tion with the perceived lack of congruence 
between Finland’s national and territorial 
borders (Browning & Joenniemi 2014, 
p. 13). Geographers claimed that the 1918 
borders were “artificial” and identified – 
in the spirit of the times – the nation’s 
expanded “natural” borders as encom-
passing Karelian territory (Paasi 1996, 
pp. 182–183). These ideas, supported by 
mounting Karelianism,2 led Finland to at-
tempt to undo its post-Winter War con-
cessions to the Soviet Union regarding 
Karelia and to launch an offensive deep 
into Soviet territory to fulfil the national 
mission and fight for Finland’s perceived 
Lebensraum; i.e. to reincorporate Karelia 
into Finland. Ultimately, however, Finland 
lost the war – and most of Karelia, which 
became subsequently systematically So-
vietised.
While the region has seen many wars 
and has often been subject to military 
incursions, after the Second World War 
Karelia’s role as a source of tension in 
Finnish-Soviet/Russian relations less-
ened (Browning & Joenniemi 2014, p. 2). 
Nevertheless, the debate on the potential 
return of ceded territories has remained 
an important matter of public debate, 
and has on occasion been endorsed at 
the highest levels. During the Cold War 
Finland developed what was widely per-
ceived as a mutually beneficial, if in many 
ways lopsided and forced, relationship 
with its former enemy, the Soviet Union. 
Politically, the USSR’s proximate military 
power resulted in a preconditioned pru-
dence to avoid causing Moscow offence, 
which was manifested in conscious and 
unconscious self-censorship and exces-
sively responsible journalism. Any open 
debate regarding Karelia was largely sup-
pressed by the era’s realpolitik-al slant, 
which to an extent only further helped 
to mythologise the position of Karelia in 
Finnish nationalist narratives. The dis-
solution of the Soviet Union freed public 
debate, which, in conjunction with its suc-
cessor’s subsequent flexibility, brought 
the Karelia Question back to the table 
and allowed a more direct formulation of 
opinions in public.
The more open border also allowed 
Finns to visit the areas that had been 
lost. However, what they discovered was 
not a “Promised Land”; the overriding 
2 Karelianism began as a cultural phenomenon involving 
writers, painters, poets, and sculptors curious about 
the Karelian heritage and landscape. It portrayed Kare-
lia as a refuge for the authentic essence of „Finnish-
ness”. Later, as WWII approached, these ideas fuelled 
an irredentist movement aspiring to create a Greater 
Finland, a single state encompassing many, if not all, 
Finnic peoples.
impression for many was of a land that 
suffered from economic stagnation, 
backwardness, and that had been largely 
Russified (Browning & Joenniemi 2014, 
p. 22). This was perhaps most famously 
captured by Gustav Hägglund, a member 
of the Finnish military leadership, in his 
1992 statement that for serious reasons 
of national defence Finland would not 
wish to have Karelia returned “even if it 
was offered on a golden plate”3 – a state-
ment whose significance was underlined 
by the fact that General Hägglund himself 
had been born in Vyborg, a city ceded to 
the Soviet Union in the Second World War. 
It became increasingly clear that there 
was no motivation amongst the Finnish 
political leadership to reopen the ques-
tion, a reflection of the realisation that 
reigniting a territorial dispute with Russia 
would only undermine Finland’s bid for 
EU membership (Medvedev 1998; Joen-
niemi 1998).
Karelia is thus not only emblematic of 
the post-Cold War political change in Eu-
rope but also affords an example of how 
a reframing of historical experiences 
and relationships has served to develop 
a new sense of cross-border “neighbour-
liness” (Belokurova 2010). Karelian 
issues are often coloured by historical 
memory and the various aspects of na-
tional symbolisms (Scott 2013, p. 81). 
The cultural landscape thus has a con-
stitutive element in the construction of 
Karelian history, as has become evident 
in the alternating, and often conflicting, 
projects of nation-building – or “nation-
alisation” (Paasi & Raivo 1998; Raivo 
2004; Heikkinen & Liikanen 2008). A 
major Karelian narrative has been that 
of its Finnish “essence” and its depiction 
as a liminal space (Shields 1991), an 
indeterminate but highly symbolic re-
gion charged with meaning for the for-
mation of the Finnish national identity 
and with powerful nostalgic significance 
(Häyrynen 2008; Fingerroos 2008).
3 Dagens Nyheter, 6 March 1992. 
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Newspapers as a Vent for Public 
Opinion
History often seems clear because it is 
written after the event. Newspapers, 
however, provide us with a valuable his-
torical record which daily details every-
day life in a text’s original context (Laine 
2015). Newspapers are products of their 
culture, which means that culture-specific 
values are almost unavoidably encoded 
in their text (Reah 1998; Fowler 1991). 
Language therefore becomes “loaded”; it 
carries with it more or less obvious con-
notations that render the message either 
limited or biased. A newspaper’s slant 
is the result of a screening process; the 
reader of a newspaper is the recipient of 
selected information (Richardson 2007). 
What is published is not only a reflection 
of events’ importance, but it also reveals 
a complex and artificial set of criteria for 
selection (Fowler 1991, p. 2). The gate-
keeping function of editors especially 
affects the contents of the letters page, 
used in the second empirical section of 
this analysis, and thus the composition 
of voices in the public debate (Wahl-Jor-
gensen 2001, p. 304; cf. Grey & Brown 
1970; Renfro 1979). When such mate-
rial is used in analysis, it is important to 
keep in mind that in choosing what to 
publish editors tend to prefer emotion-
ally charged, personal stories, and look 
for an aesthetic authenticity that shows 
the writer’s words “come from the heart”, 
forging emotional bonds between readers 
and writers (Ibid.). 
In many cases the letters page forms 
one of the most popular, and one of the 
most important, elements of a newspa-
per; to a large extent the public is often 
more interested in the views of other 
readers than in those of the professionals 
(Romanov et al. 1969). The letters page is 
also widely celebrated as one of the few 
arenas for ordinary citizens to engage in 
public discussion, making it a key insti-
tution of the public sphere. Rather than 
being an aggregate of individual opinions, 
Habermas (1997, p. 59) suggests, public 
opinion is something people arrive at to-
gether through communicative public ac-
tion – public discussion and debate. The 
letters page as a forum is influenced by an 
editorial agenda; instead of serving as a 
representative barometer of public opin-
ion, it provides a “hazy reflection of public 
opinion” (Grey & Brown 1970, p. 450). 
Letter writers tend to be demographi-
cally and politically unrepresentative of 
the general public (Sigelman & Walkosz 
1992, p. 944) – typically middle-aged 
or older, male, well educated, well em-
ployed, and conservative (Singletary & 
Cowling 1979, p. 165). However, as we 
are especially interested in the develop-
ment of public opinion, this bias presents 
no problems if it remains stable over the 
years of our analysis.4 
The material used for this research has 
been collected from Helsingin Sanomat 
(HS), which is the largest subscription 
newspaper in Finland. The paper was 
founded as Päivälehti in 1889, when Fin-
land was a Grand Duchy under the Tsar of 
Russia, to serve as an organ of the Young 
Finnish Party. As the paper opposed Rus-
sification and advocated greater Finnish 
freedom and even full independence, it 
was often forced to suspend publication. 
During its history HS has established itself 
as a significant player in Finnish society. 
The paper has been politically independ-
ent and non-aligned since the 1930s. The 
opinion page was published for the first 
time on 30 November 1977. The propor-
tion of letters published to those received 
has fluctuated over the years. The record 
was set in 2010, when there were more 
than 24,000 letters to the editor (Fig. 2). 
On average the recent publication/ac-
ceptance rate has been around 25 per 
cent. Although the large quantity of let-
ters makes the selection process difficult, 
the editors of the HS opinion pages main-
tain that their main purpose remains to 
“reflect the entire spectrum of the Finnish 
opinion climate as closely as possible” (HS 
10. 1. 1993; also 31. 12. 2010).
In the following, prior to proceeding to 
the analysis of the tone and orientation 
4 This analysis of public opinion confines itself to letters 
to the editor. We are aware of the importance of social 
media, but have chosen not to include this, mainly 
because our analysis starts in the early 90s of the 
previous century, when social media as we now know 
it did not really exist (see: boyd & ElliSon 2008).
of the public opinion proper, the col-
lected empirical material consisting of 
the letters to the editor (indicated as ‘L’), 
but also editorials (E) and op-eds (OE) in 
cases where they were clearly linked with 
the discussion taking place in the letters, 
is elucidated as to demonstrate how the 
debate on Karelia has evolved and been 
impacted by broader national and re-
gional developments as well as changes in 
prominent geopolitical context since the 
early 1990s. A total of 5,089 opinion ar-
ticles that discussed the Finnish-Russian 
border or relations more in general were 
collected from the years 1990–2015, yet 
only the articles focusing on Karelia were 
included in this analysis. The aim here is 
to situate what has been discussed in the 
context in which it has occurred in order 
to investigate the discursive field of signi-
fying practices, explain meaning-making 
as a social practice and describe the po-
tential changes in the foci of the debates 
by interlinking them with the broader 
changes that have occurred at the border.
The Karelia Question in/and 
 Helsingin Sanomat
Two significant external events during 
the study period stand out: the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and Fin-
land’s accession to the EU in early 1995. 
Both allowed new interpretations of Fin-
land’s position, but also provided a new 
framework for the Karelia Question. By 
1990 the situation in the Soviet Union had 
deteriorated to the point that debates in 
Finland about the future of Finno-Soviet 
relations had begun to intensify. Although 
the Finns were now more confident about 
diverging from official policy as compared 
with previous decades, in practice official 
foreign policy and public opinion contin-
ued to largely coincide. Polls suggested 
that 80 per cent of Finns believed that 
the 1948 Agreement of Friendship, Coop-
eration and Mutual Assistance had been 
necessary (HS 23. 12. 1990), and that no 
fewer than 75 percent believed that the 
treaty would remain in force until 2000. 
It was therefore no surprise that nearly 
70 percent of Finns also agreed with the 
official government position that the 
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Karelia Question had been settled and it 
was better not to act on the matter (HS 
10. 12. 1990).
While it was understood that the com-
plete return of Karelia was an unrealistic 
goal, it was suggested that when the time 
was ripe Finns should seize the opportu-
nity and seek to “create a normal neigh-
bourhood through cooperation across the 
eastern border” for this was “certainly 
what the masses wish” (HS L 9. 10. 1991). 
Only one in four wished the government 
to take the initiative to restore Karelia. 
However, when President Koivisto (in of-
fice between 1982 and 1994) dismissed 
the hopes of those who wanted Karelia 
returned by reminding them that Finland 
had lost it in two wars (HS L 23. 9. 1991), 
discussion about the territory became 
critical of the Finnish political elite. 
Continuing to live by the former and in-
troverted political formulas of “sneak-
ing around and lacking initiative” (HS L 
9. 10. 1991) was deemed to help neither 
Finland nor its neighbour. It was rather 
suggested that the new situation required 
both an open mind and willingness to act 
quickly now “that mending the old com-
munist era errors” was at its peak in the 
Soviet Union and all the problems had 
been exposed for what they were (HS L 
9. 10. 1991).
The collapse of the Soviet Union was 
immediately seen as providing the longed 
for opportunity to make a move on the 
Karelia Question. The ongoing prepara-
tion of a new treaty to be signed with 
what was now Russia was also seen as 
crucial for Karelia’s future:
“It is now the eleventh hour if the 
matter of Karelia, and in particular 
the new Russia agreement, is to be 
brought to a critical parliamentary 
reading. If signed, the agreement will 
seal the Karelia Question indefinitely, 
because this time the agreement will 
be signed of our own free will.” (HS L 
26. 1. 1992)
It was directly suggested that Karelia 
should be returned to Finland because it 
had been “annexed by violence” through 
“barbarian injustice” and because the in-
vasion had also been considered illegal by 
the League of Nations (HS L 2. 6. 1992). In 
addition to enabling a fresh start for re-
lations, the return of Karelia, it was sug-
gested, “would lift the people out of their 
spiritual recession” (HS L 28. 6. 1992) 
and restore “our spiritual, and perhaps 
eventually even financial, capital” (HS L 
13. 10. 1993). Others acquiesced to the 
official view that the Finns could not “re-
quire the return of Karelia” as it had once 
been “given away” (HS L 7. 1. 1992). How-
ever, no one could dispute that the Finns 
had a “moral right to hope for it” (Ibid.). 
While in the ideal case scenario the 
Finnish-Russian border would “shrink to 
be like a European border as is the prac-
tice, for example, between the Nordic 
countries or within the EU”, for the mo-
ment there were no signs that this goal 
could ever be realised (HS L 29. 6. 1992). 
Russian President Yeltsin’s (1991–1999) 
proposal to make the border of ceded Ka-
relia “transparent” was greeted positively, 
because it was seen as offering a potential 
0
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basis for solving the Karelia Question (HS 
L 22. 7. 1992). The proposal suggested 
that Karelia would continue to belong 
to Russia, but that a transparent border 
would allow closer interaction. In Finland 
the proposal was interpreted as meaning 
the facilitation of border crossings and 
even visa-free travel, the latter of which 
was rejected outright by the Finnish Pres-
ident Koivisto (HS L 22. 7. 1992).
However, the debate about Karelia soon 
receded as the focus of the political elite 
had already shifted westward. A new co-
operation treaty was now signed with 
Russia, replacing the 1948 Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance trea-
ty and the special relations it had framed. 
Only a few weeks later Finland applied 
for membership of the EU. Prime Minister 
Paavo Lipponen’s (1995–2003) “inadvert-
ently cynical” announcement that Finland 
had no interest in taking back the ceded 
areas, even if they were offered, because 
Finland could not afford it, was taken as 
an “unfortunate example of our ever-sec-
ularising world” (HS L 27. 8. 1995). The 
debate focused less on the EU per se, and 
more on the implications of EU member-
ship for the Finnish-Russian relationship. 
The threatening Soviet Union had become 
an unpredictable Russia, and few knew 
what to expect.
The Russian 1998 financial crisis fuelled 
the Karelia debate yet again. The Finn-
ish media was accused of being cowardly 
and “the last fortress of Finlandisation”5 
for not taking an active part and posi-
tion in the debate. This prompted the HS 
editorial reporter Erkki Pennanen finally 
to address the issue by arguing that to 
jump aboard the revanchist spirit, which 
had strengthened in some circles as a re-
sponse to Russia’s perceived weakness 
arising from its worsening financial situ-
ation, would lead to “daydream journal-
ism” and a Karelia debate which might 
be characterised as being about “who’s 
5 Finlandisation, a term coined in 1961 by German poli-
tical scientist Richard Löwenthal, can be defined as 
a process by which a powerful country strongly influ-
ences the policies of a smaller neighbouring country, 
while allowing it to keep its independence and its own 
political system. It originally refers to the influence of 
the Soviet Union on Finland’s policies during the Cold 
War.
afraid of the big bad wolf?”. The editorial 
went on to question the rectitude and ex-
ceptionality of the basic premises of the 
debate and to suggest that EU-Europe, the 
new frame of reference for Finland, was 
the wrong place for such revanchism (HS 
E 20. 1. 1998).
If the aim of the editorial had been to 
de-escalate the debate, it failed terribly. It 
sparked an intense dispute not just about 
the reasons for and against the return of 
Karelia to Finland, but also about how the 
topic should be discussed. Mr. Pennanen 
was accused of siding with Russia; his 
writing was attacked for using “variants 
of expressions used by Russians” and for 
distinguishing the Karelians from the 
Finns “in an orthodox Russian manner” 
(HS L 29. 1. 1998). After all, the Karelia 
Question “should be a matter for Finns 
and not just Karelians” (HS L 2. 6. 1999). It 
was argued that Mr. Pennanen and hence 
Helsingin Sanomat and the Russians were 
bound together in that they both saw the 
restoration of Karelia as an issue not for 
the entire Finnish people, but only for the 
Karelians, which facilitated the issue’s 
trivialisation. However, agreement on 
the issue was hardly helped when a pro-
ponent of the return of Karelia referred 
to those “who think they are highly intel-
ligent when they refuse to countenance 
the Karelia’s return” as “non-people” (HS 
L 5. 7. 1998). 
The premise of Mr. Pennanen’s refer-
ence to a wider European framework was 
criticised because not everyone compre-
hended “[w]hy the eastern border of Fin-
land, in particular, should be sanctified 
and eternal, while the ‘European order’ is 
in this respect the result of an agreement 
between those [Hitler and Stalin] who 
carried out two massacres in 1939” (HS 
L 1. 2. 1998). The idea that the “image 
of Finland [was] as a manager of others’ 
things all around the world” to be “pol-
ished” at the same time as “we have our 
own chickens waiting to be plucked” (HS 
L 2. 6. 1999) was thus deemed incoher-
ent and misguided. Others felt that the 
fact that Finns now lived in an EU-Europe 
did not mean an end to the hopes for Ka-
relia’s restoration, but presented a new 
opportunity because the borders could 
now “be restored under bilateral peace 
agreements” (HS L 9. 7. 1998). 
For the most part public debate about 
Karelia remained focused on whether 
the ceded areas should be returned to 
Finland. Simply put, Finland was deemed 
to have “a right to demand the return 
of Karelia” (HS L 28. 7. 1998) as it had 
been annexed illegally by Stalin (e. g. HS 
L 31. 7. 1998, 21. 11. 1998, 28. 11. 1998) 
and because it rightly “belongs to us” (HS 
L 30. 7. 1998) and would have to be “saved 
from them [the current Russian residents 
of the area]” (HS L 2. 6. 1999). The mat-
ter was thus a “question of basic rights” 
(HS 26. 8. 1998) and about nullifying the 
“aggressor’s rewards” (HS L 3. 2. 1998). 
Returning the divested areas would not 
only be “beneficial for Finland over time”, 
but also of “great political and economic 
benefit to Russia” (HS L 30. 8. 1998), be-
cause both countries would benefit from 
a more prosperous Karelia. 
Those against the return of Karelia 
wrote more descriptively, striking a pes-
simistic note and depicting Karelia as 
undesirable, usually because of its large 
non-Finnish population and the costs 
its return to Finland would entail. While 
those who advocated the return of Karelia 
were more active in writing to the paper, 
the majority of the Finnish population 
was however said to “stand behind the 
current border both geopolitically and 
otherwise” (HS L 1. 8. 1998) and to concur 
with the idea that “the future [of Finland] 
does not need Karelia” (HS L 29. 8. 1998).
At the beginning of the new millen-
nium, with Vladimir Putin (2000–2008; 
2012-present) in power in Russia, a “new 
era of intense interaction” began in Finn-
ish-Russian relations (HS E 2. 3. 2002). 
Relations were seen to be grounded in, 
and enabled by, Finland’s strengthened 
status as an EU member, Mr. Putin’s 
earlier connections to Finland, and the 
new possibilities opened by his reform 
policies. However, euphoria about Pu-
tin quickly evaporated. Whereas events 
in Russia had been central to the inter-
national news-flow in the previous 15 
years, Russia was suddenly now almost 
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forgotten. “Nothing of special interest” 
took place in Russia, the country’s influ-
ence was judged to have diminished in 
international politics, and few seemed to 
know what was happening there (HS OE 
16. 4. 2002). No news was not, however, 
simply good news from either Russia’s or 
its Western partners’ perspective. 
Those longing for the return of the 
ceded territories, it was suggested, were 
a marginal phenomenon. Instead, the mis-
erable state of Karelia was threatening to 
“poison” Finns’ attitude towards Russia in 
a completely different way. The terrifying 
image of the parlous situation in Karelia 
that had come to light during the recent 
severe frost, the editorial column (HS E 
9. 2. 2003) suggested, served unmistak-
ably to corroborate the realistic-pessimis-
tic view of the older generation of Finns. 
The blunter debate about Karelia was, 
however, a clear sign of more open condi-
tions and a less restricted use of language. 
Nevertheless, although Karelia was dis-
cussed more openly and many visits there 
were made, a growing majority of Finns 
rejected the idea of its return. An HS Gal-
lup poll revealed that nearly two-thirds of 
Finns saw the return of Karelia as unde-
sirable, a third saw it as completely un-
desirable, whereas only one in ten saw it 
as desirable. These figures were taken to 
reflect Finnish pragmatism rather than 
sentiment. No one had forgotten that “the 
areas were unjustly seized from Finland” 
(HS E 22. 8. 2005), but there was neither 
a place nor a politically fertile spiritual 
ground for a mood for revenge in con-
temporary Europe, and especially not in 
Finland. Accordingly, the Finnish Karelian 
League, which had once directly advocat-
ed the return of Karelia, now focused its 
work on the preservation of the history, 
traditions, and culture of the Karelia that 
had been lost. However, in an interview 
with HS the following day the chairman 
of the Finnish Karelian League not only 
claimed that “Karelianism is alive and 
well, even if the state border is at its pre-
sent location”, but insisted that “[a]fter all, 
spiritually we own Karelia, even if it is not 
part of the Finnish state” (HS 23. 8. 2005).
The fact that the HS editorial board 
yet again took a position on the Karelia 
Question (HS E 27. 6. 2006) only fuelled 
the debate further. It argued that specu-
lation about the recovery of the area lost 
in the wars was unrealistic hankering. 
It was suggested that while it was easy 
to understand the longing for Karelia, the 
reality was that Finland had accepted the 
existing border in international agree-
ments. Changing it by voluntary arrange-
ment seemed no more likely than it ever 
had. The editorial received its anticipated 
response. It was accused of being mistak-
en in several matters, and it was averred 
that there was no denying that ceded 
Karelia was an essential part of Finnish 
national history (HS L 21. 7. 2006). While 
some felt the Finnish leadership’s passiv-
ity had been wise because “foreign policy 
should not be made according to nostal-
gic emotional criteria, but based on real-
istic cool calculations of benefits” (HS L 
28. 7. 2006; cf. HS L 11. 8. 2006) and that 
the return of Karelia today was indeed un-
realistic (HS L 21. 8. 2006), others argued 
that its return would benefit both Finland 
and Russia (HS L 30. 7. 2006).
In the second half of the 2000s the de-
bate became increasingly realistic. The 
romantic image of lost Karelia was de-
scribed as “skewed and imaginary” (HS 
OE 4. 8. 2009). It was evident that sev-
eral people still had a personal, national, 
or ideological bond with the border re-
gion, but this bond was superficial: 
“A zeal for Karelianism springs into 
life in most cases only during the 
summer. It belongs to the summer in 
the same way as the Midsummer fes-
tival, flies, and barbecue. During the 
winter Karelia is not wanted – Rus-
sian Karelia does not exist in the win-
ter for the Finns.” (HS OE 4. 8. 2009)
The article went on to fan the flames by 
asserting that contemporary tourism 
was politically framed: Russian Karelia 
was made more Finnish by being “over 
there”. It also touched on a sacred topic 
by suggesting that in addition to the hu-
man tragedy, the yearning for lost Kare-
lia could be explained as an attempt to 
spread a map of political memory around 
Karelia as well as by the unfortunate 
trauma the failed military operation had 
caused. The bitterness of loss, it argued, 
had been reproduced ever since in mem-
oirs and reminiscences. 
The article touched a nerve among 
many. As it acknowledged before re-
sponses began to come in, even today it 
was “unacceptable to discuss deficiencies, 
such as financial hardship, the civil war, 
the ill treatment of Russians, or the hu-
man inequality of the lost societies at the 
same time as memories of Karelia” (HS OE 
4. 8. 2009). The debate would, however, 
be normalised, because with the passage 
of time even those who had had to leave 
their homes and who saw such questions 
as taboo would be seen from a less emo-
tional and more realistic perspective. The 
image of modern Karelia portrayed by the 
researchers, for all its realism, was incom-
patible with the “politically oriented or 
emotional love for Karelia”. The integra-
tion of the two lenses of analysis, howev-
er, was expected to make contemporary 
travel across the border more enriching 
than it had been when it was to “meander 
in the ruins of the Finnish houses in the 
border area” (Ibid.).
As might have been expected, many Ka-
relians and their descendants struggled to 
recognise themselves in this somewhat 
simplistic and disparaging generalisa-
tion presented as an academic perspec-
tive. A representative of the Finnish Ka-
relian League wrote (HS L 7. 8. 2009) to 
reclaim the Karelians’ right to reminisce 
by asserting that they were not seeking 
traces of their Finnishness, but of them-
selves, their families, and their ancestry. 
They had lived in Karelia for hundreds 
of years, and their search was for traces 
of their Karelian culture. Such herit-
age tourism was thus a key part of Kare-
lian identity, which had traditionally been 
strongly place-specific and geographically 
bound, and it also gave the young de-
scendants of Karelian immigrants “many 
meanings, social capital, and in particu-
lar a great sense of solidarity” (Ibid.). This 
cross-border travel could also be seen as 
the first form of cross-border interaction, 
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because many had tried to help the el-
derly and families with children in Kare-
lia in various ways when they visited. The 
editorial staff of HS restricted themselves 
to replying that a better knowledge of the 
Swedish and Finnish history of former 
Finnish Karelia would undoubtedly be 
beneficial for the current population and 
an obvious goal for a civilised country. 
This, in turn, would create a more solid 
base for relations between Russia and 
Finland, as well as between Russians and 
Finns, which should gradually arrive at 
a more natural and more mature phase 
( HS E 11. 11. 2009).
Whereas analysis of newspaper ma-
terial suggests that the image of Russia 
had normalised and become more hon-
est by 2010, developments since have 
again reversed this trend and media 
coverage has again strongly reinforced 
the perception of Russia as the problem-
atic other. Broader geopolitical concerns 
have clearly overshadowed the debate on 
Karelia, reflected in the decreasing num-
ber of letters focusing on it (Fig. 3). The 
Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 
was a tipping point heralding an unex-
pected change in both official and public 
rhetoric. Debate about Karelia was practi-
cally non-existent, although some letters 
discussed the potential impact of the 
Ukraine crisis on Finland and its border 
with Russia. It was only in 2015 that the 
increased influx of refugees refuelled the 
discussion about Karelia, as many drew 
parallels between the contemporary 
situation and the evacuation of Finnish 
Karelians and the ceding of Karelia after 
the 1940 Moscow Peace Treaty that had 
ended the Winter War.
The Karelia Question in Public 
Opinion
The second empirical analysis concerns 
public opinion as it appears in the letters 
to the editor between 1990 and 2015. 
An initial simple word search for Karelia 
yielded 525 relevant letters for analysis 
out of 161,698 published during this pe-
riod. Given that on average only a quarter 
of letters make it to the printed version of 
the newspaper, the total number of letters 
on this topic sent to the editor is of course 
much higher. For example, during a two-
month period from mid-September to 
mid-November 1991, no fewer than 225 
letters about the Karelia Question were 
sent to the editor, but only 53 of these (24 
per cent) were published. 
Karelia Question
As we are especially interested in the Ka-
relia Question, the selected letters were 
first scrutinised to see if the Question 
was addressed. This was the case in a lit-
tle over half the contributions (285). The 
remainder focused on other aspects of 
Karelia, but made no specific reference to 
the actual question. The overall picture 
is one of a generally declining interest in 
Karelia in readers’ contributions, and of 
a fluctuating division over the years be-
tween those that address the question 
and those that discuss Karelia in a more 
general sense, which is often sparked by 
a particular event or an individual article 
(Fig. 3). Despite the possible influence 
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of editorial policy, the general decline in 
the number of letters is still an indication 
that the Karelia Question is becoming less 
newsworthy. 
The analysis began by focusing on 
whether the authors supported or op-
posed reunification. In general, the pro-
portion of people in favour of reunification 
(returning Karelia to Finland) was declin-
ing. In the most recent period there was 
a slight increase. Within the group that 
seemed to be in favour a further distinc-
tion was made between those who were in 
favour out of principle (Karelia as a whole 
is a “natural” part of Finland), those who 
were in favour but wanted to negotiate 
reunification, and a third group that was 
basically in favour but was prepared to 
delay it and in the meantime foster close 
cooperation. Letters showing a resist-
ance towards reunification were further 
divided into a group that was prepared 
to cooperate (without a readjustment of 
the border, “owning” Karelia by being pre-
sent) and a group that distinctly wished 
to ignore the Russian part as a lost cause. 
In all, almost three- quarters of the letters 
analysed were in favour of reunification: 
38 percent argued that the question was a 
matter of principle, while 28 percent were 
willing to negotiate the matter with Rus-
sia. Of those against reunification, about 
two-thirds were prepared to cooperate.
When the element of time was added, 
the analysis revealed that while the prin-
cipal account held true, an increasing 
proportion regarded cooperation, not 
readjustment of the borderline, as a so-
lution to the Karelia Question. This co-
operative approach had overtaken the 
more extreme voices wishing to ignore 
the entire matter. Shifting the border was 
no longer perceived as a realistic goal, 
not only because of Russia’s negative at-
titude, but also because the current situ-
ation was now part of a pan-European 
reality and the Finnish-Russian border 
was only one among many that had been 
drawn with the sword after the Second 
World War. If one were to begin to modify 
them, “the whole European order would 
start to be shaken” (HS 12. 6. 2002). Es-
sentially, there was therefore no reason 
to seek a readjustment of the border, be-
cause the role of borders per se in Europe 
had fundamentally changed: “In a united 
Europe, [b]orders are no longer insur-
mountable crevasses insulating countries 
from each other. They are open” (Ibid.).
Signifiers and signified
The core of our analysis of people’s 
meaning-making is a combination of a 
more qualitative social semiotic analysis 
and a more quantitative oriented content 
analysis. While a linguistic analysis of the 
newspaper material is beyond the scope 
of the current research, a semiotic ap-
proach does allow us to see beyond mere 
words and numbers. We combined this 
with a more quantitative approach on 
how often the different signifiers were 
used over the different periods. The more 
qualitative approach based on social se-
miotics helps us in how these signifiers 
might be interpreted both where it con-
cerns the signified and the tone. 
Drawing upon social semiotics enables 
us to study not just what signs mean (se-
mantics), but also to focus on how they 
mean. Semiotics distinguishes between 
communication and signification (Saus-
sure 1974; Barthes 1988). While com-
munication is understood as the mere 
transfer of knowledge from sender to 
receiver, signification refers to commu-
nicative meaning-making, whereby a text 
evokes a process of interpretation in the 
receiver. 
Social semiotics builds on the founda-
tional work of Ferdinand de Saussure, 
but takes a step further by emphasis-
ing the socially contextualised nature of 
signs and meaning-making (signifying) 
processes and practices. For Saussure 
(1974) the term signification referred to 
the dyadic relationship between the signi-
fier (signifiant) and the signified (signifié), 
which together constituted a sign (Fig. 4). 
A sign can be anything as long as someone 
interprets it as signifying something (Pei-
rce 1931; Chandler 2002). As Saussure 
(1974, p. 118) himself puts it, it is not the 
metal in a coin that fixes its value. 
Signs are not stable, but constantly 
made afresh; the relationship between 
the signifier and signified is in a constant 
state of flux as people connect form and 
meaning in ways deemed apt for the par-
ticular need and occasion (Kress 1997). 
On the one hand, the same signifier can 
stand for a different signified (constitut-
ing a different sign). A black cat in some 
cultures stands for good fortune and in 
others for bad. On the other hand, many 
signifiers can also stand for the same sig-
nified (again forming a different sign). 
Russia is at times portrayed as assertive 
or even as the aggressive Russian bear, 
but also as a dear neighbour. 
In our case the signified is in all cases 
Karelia (or the question about it) and/or 
Russia. Drawing upon the work of Eden-
sor (1998; 2002) and Wodak (2004; 
2008), we distinguish five categories 
of signifiers: activities; objects; events; 
places; and stories. An important deter-
mining factor of the activities signifier is 
that it can be characterised as being of 
longer duration or having a certain per-
manence. It concerns, for example, longer 
lasting processes and policies. An event, 
however, is more or less a one-time occur-
rence. This might be a natural disaster, a 
political act, or a historical event. Objects 
can either be categorised as material cul-
ture or as personifying certain groups. 
The category of places is used when a 
clear reference is made to specific geog-
raphies and landscapes. Finally, stories 
point to accounts, narrative, reports, and 
myths mainly related to (a shared) histo-
ry. When it comes to the Karelia Question 
in general, places, events, and stories can 
be seen as discussing this within a tradi-
tion of storytelling, often referring to a 
signifier
signified
Source: adapted from
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mythical history. Activities and objects, 
on the other hand, are used more often 
in contemporary discussion and are more 
subject to the spur of the moment.
Letters on defence strategies, the pro-
cess of Europeanisation, humanitarian 
aid, cooperation etc. were labelled as us-
ing activities (characterised as having a 
longer duration or certain permanence) 
as signifiers. Those dealing with the evac-
uation of Finnish Karelia after the Win-
ter War, a proposition in Finnish politics, 
or an environmental incident were put 
in the event category. Letters discussing 
the Finnish leadership, Russia, Ingrians, 
Karelians, etc. were regarded as address 
objects – material culture or personifica-
tions of certain groups. This mainly con-
cerned the latter in our analysis. When 
Karelia or specific locations like Vyborg 
were used, the letter was categorised as 
dealing with places (making a clear ref-
erence to specific geographies and land-
scapes). Finally, stories (as accounts, nar-
rative, reports, and myths related mainly 
to (a shared history)) in our case trans-
lated into issues such as the Finnish rights 
to Karelia, the (re)drawing of the border, 
personal histories, and the historic ac-
tions of Stalin or the USSR. 
Having labelled the letters by content, 
their general tone was established. We 
confined ourselves here to a simple three-
fold categorisation: positive; neutral; or 
negative. Finally, for analytical purposes 
we also labelled the letters by their at-
titude towards Karelia as a region and 
Russia in general as the signified. Here 
again we used the categories of positive, 
neutral, and negative. Having established 
the coding of the letters, several analyses 
were performed by confronting the signi-
fiers with the tone of the letters in general 
and concerning Karelia and Russia. Spe-
cial interest was then paid to the develop-
ment of both the signifiers used as well as 
the general attitude during the previous 
two and a half decades.
For analytical purposes we distin-
guished six periods. These are based on 
the analysis of the development of the 
Karelia Question as it appeared in Hels-
ingin Sanomat (in the previous section). 
The first (1990–1993) was labelled Rus-
siaphoria, because the collapse of the So-
viet Union was seen as the long awaited 
opportunity to move on the Karelia Ques-
tion, while at the same time there was 
uncertainty concerning developments 
and what they would mean for the Finn-
ish-Russian relationship. In the following 
years (1994–1997) Finnish accession to 
the EU was seen as a major step in seek-
ing protection against an increasingly 
unpredictable Russia, causing a state of 
EUphoria. Between 1998 and 2000 the 
financial Crisis in Russia fuelled debates 
about Karelia. When Putin came to pow-
er, the idea of a period of Transitionism 
gained traction, and there was a period of 
relative optimism in the Finnish-Russian 
relationship, which, however, soon faded. 
Between 2007 and 2011 we can witness 
a state of New Realism, in which roman-
tic images of Karelia and the relationship 
with Russia were exchanged for more 
realistic ones that could now be depicted 
less emotionally. In the period from 2012, 
which coincides with Putin’s third presi-
dential term, there is a tendency to work 
Towards a New Standoff with Russia, al-
beit with an uncertain outcome.
As figure 5 implies, most of the ana-
lysed letters fall under the main signi-
fier categories of activity (82 letters) and 
story (70 letters). Places (used in 53 let-
ters) and objects (50 letters) almost tied 
for third place, while events were used 
less as a signifier (30 letters). These are, 
of course, analytical distinctions to help 
structure the analysis. In practice, cat-
egories are interrelated as many letters 
referred to more than one. However, in 
most cases the prime signifier was quite 
easy to identify.
What is remarkable is that in the most 
recent periods the proportion of (his)sto-
ries used as signifiers has increased. The 
more contemporary activities and objects 
on the other hand are used less. This may 
be explained by the fact that Karelia – and 
especially reunification – is becoming a 
myth. In the most recent period events 
are the most frequently occurring signi-
fiers, again an indication that Karelia and 
its question are becoming a thing of the 
past. Of course, we must keep in mind that 
the number of letters in the later periods 
is quite small. The evidence concerning 
letters’ general tone or connotation is in 
line with this. The proportion of negative 
letters declined from 50 to 65 percent 
in earlier years to about 30 percent on 
more recent years. This may also indicate 
that the rough edges of the Karelian scar 
are slowly healing and fading in people’s 
memory, while the more neutral and posi-
tive images remain. When this is linked to 
the signifier categories we can see some 
marked differences. When the categories 
of activities and objects, signalling a more 
contemporary and current interpretation 
are employed, most letters have a clearly 
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negative connotation. Events, places, and 
stories (indication often a more historical 
view) are used more positively. This may 
also be explained as a mythologisation of 
the question. When the latter signifiers 
are used, the Karelia Question seems to 
be seen increasingly as a thing of the past 
and thus more neutrally and even posi-
tively (Fig. 6).
A special note may be made concern-
ing the signifier category “place”, which 
was most often used in a positive sense. 
Almost two-thirds of the letters were 
positive. This may be the result of the fact 
that Karelia was used to an extent with 
respect to a different signified. In some 
letters Karelia was approached almost as 
an internal Finnish issue with little or no 
reference to Russia. 
When we explicitly examine how Kare-
lia is portrayed in the letters, we find that 
the proportion with a clearly positive at-
titude is diminishing with the exception 
of the final period (Fig. 7). On average this 
also applies to those with an outspoken 
negative opinion. Consequently, the issue 
is increasingly dealt with quite neutrally, 
or in a more “realist(ic)” and less polar-
ised way. It has become part of everyday 
life. 
Finally, when we examine how Russia is 
viewed, the most obvious finding is that 
with a single exception there are no let-
ters exhibiting a positive attitude. As for 
the others, on average it is possible to 
observe a slight and increasing tendency 
towards a neutral position. Remarkably, 
the same signifier can stand for more than 
one signified, thus constituting a differ-
ent sign. For example, when cross-border 
cooperation is discussed using Karelia 
as a signified, the tone is often positive, 
whereas when the signified is Russia, the 
tone is notably more negative. Similarly, 
places and stories about Karelia take a 
positive, or at least neutral, position no-
ticeably more often than those depicting 
Russia as the signified. 
Conclusions
This analysis of the public debate in Hels-
ingin Sanomat has provided a fascinating 
overview of how Finnish attitudes and 
opinions concerning the Karelia Question 
have evolved since the 1990s. The start-
ing point of the analysis was the interest-
ing period when the threat of the Soviet 
Union lessened, allowing a previously 
unseen scope for free public debate. With 
the end of the Cold War the previously 
stable border concept was transformed 
into something broader and more com-
plex, but this also meant that the question 
about a potential adjustment of the bor-
der was no longer considered untouch-
able. 
The study period was divided into six 
shorter periods with a distinctive tone 
and focus. As the Soviet Union collapsed 
and Finland came to share a border with 
its successor, the Russian Federation, the 
rules of the game changed fundamen-
tally. The “end of history” provided a new 
beginning, and the disappearance of a 
neighbour to which Finns had grown ac-
customed and with which they had traded 
resulted in a severe recession, which also 
contributed to the marked opportunism 
of the early years (1990–1993), accompa-
nied by a somewhat positive vision of the 
future of Finnish-Russian relations. When 
the signs used at that time are examined, 
all categories are almost equally repre-
sented, with events slightly underrepre-
sented. Compared with the subsequent 
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two periods the general tone is relatively 
positive. 
Between 1994 and 1997 the debate 
focused increasingly on the EU and the 
significance it would have for the Finn-
ish-Russian relationship. This period 
shows the highest proportion of letters 
in favour of negotiation concerning the 
Karelia Question. This is possibly encour-
aged by the perceived support of the EU. 
Compared with other periods, activities 
are used more frequently and the general 
tone of the letters becomes more nega-
tive, whereas Karelia is talked about more 
neutrally. 
In 1998 the financial crisis in Russia 
briefly fuelled debates about Karelia. 
While the older generations’ attitudes 
were guided largely by the emotions, the 
young tended to prefer reason. They ar-
gued that Karelia’s fate had already been 
sealed and that patriotism had its limits. 
Sentiment concerning the Karelia Ques-
tion increasingly turned against the idea 
of returning the region to Finland. This 
is also the period when places are most 
used as a signifier. The general tone re-
mains somewhat negative. As the most 
used signifier often relates to a specific 
Karelian location or geography, it is un-
surprising that the general tone concern-
ing the region is also quite negative com-
pared with other periods.
With Vladimir Putin in power a period 
of relative optimism about the Finnish-
Russian relationship began. Demands for 
the restoration of Karelia were softened 
as increased interaction was deemed to 
provide significant benefits and new eco-
nomic opportunities to both parties. At-
tempts were made to go beyond the tradi-
tional Karelia Question; it was suggested 
that instead of painting threats, attention 
should be paid to exploiting the benefits 
of globalisation, i.e., enlarged market 
areas, a reduction in the importance of 
borders, and the growing importance of 
knowledge, cultural enrichment, and di-
versification. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that the proportion of letters against 
reunification but willing to cooperate is 
the largest in this period. Objects are used 
relatively often and the tone of letters 
becomes more neutral and even positive. 
Karelia itself is regarded much more neu-
trally. The general tone concerning Russia 
is also largely neutral. The proportion of 
clearly negative letters is the smallest in 
this period.
From 2007 we can observe a state of 
New Realism, in which the almost roman-
tic images of Karelia and the relationship 
with Russia are exchanged for more real-
istic ones that can now be depicted in less 
emotional terms. Although a relatively 
large number of letters continues to op-
pose the return of Karelia, the proportion 
in favour on principle is also sizeable. 
This suggests a conflict between a more 
emotional longing for the past and a more 
realistic academic approach to Karelia. 
This is also a period when stories become 
more important as signifiers. In general, 
there is a correlation between the use of 
stories and being in favour of the return 
of Karelia on principle.
The most outstanding feature of the 
most recent period is a further increase in 
those in favour of the restoration of Kare-
lia on principle. Although some caution is 
required in drawing conclusions because 
of the relatively small number of letters, 
this may itself be explained by a declin-
ing interest in the Karelia Question itself 
(especially among those who formerly 
opposed reunification) and the confir-
mation of the possible threat presented 
by contemporary Russia (fuelled by the 
events in the region) and the consequent 
declining probability of a common solu-
tion for Karelia retaining the current bor-
ders. This has been accompanied by an 
increase in the use of (historic) events as 
signifiers, the less positive tone of letters, 
but also a more favourable tone concern-
ing Karelia.
Karelia Question 2.0
The Karelia Question has become in-
creasingly more about principle and less 
about practice. This should not, however, 
be taken to indicate that Karelia has lost 
its evocative role in the Finnish national 
identity discourse altogether, but rather 
that the nature of this role has begun to 
change. The anxiety generated by the loss 
of Karelia has been salved by the formula-
tion of different self-narratives (Brown-
ing & Joenniemi 2014, p. 2). The repa-
triation of Karelia, once seen as possible, 
has now become a receding myth, far-re-
moved from the key political debates of 
today. Given the ageing population, direct 
links to the lost areas have diminished. 
While some Finns may indeed consider 
that they “spiritually” own Karelia, it re-
mains very much part of Russia. Debate 
concerning Karelia stems from the past 
and often gets stuck there. Instead of fo-
cusing on what is happening today, the de-
bate tends to look back and builds heav-
ily on personal accounts that are difficult 
to verify. Subjective historical remarks 
about what once happened are often pre-
sented as facts, based on which the “truth” 
is generated in the form of a story. This 
supports Raivo’s (2004, p. 71) argument 
that in the contemporary context it is no 
longer so important to whom the ceded 
areas should belong now or in the future, 
but the question is rather about to whom 
their past belongs. While there are differ-
ences of opinion, nowadays both sides at 
least realise that there are two parallel 
narratives associated with the memory 
and traditions of Karelia: a Finnish past 
and a Russian present (Ibid.).
During the study period the national 
appropriations of Karelia that have es-
pecially characterised the Finnish debate 
in the past, particularly until 2014, have 
been transcended by notions of a shared 
regional space. Accordingly, the question 
of ownership has been overshadowed by 
a new rhetoric promoting cross-border 
cooperation and a reframing of history to 
better match with the evolving multifac-
eted, and to an extent post-national, re-
gional understandings of Karelia. Instead 
of understanding Karelia within the tradi-
tional framework of nationalising histori-
ographies, these interpretations have de-
picted Karelia as a borderland – a space of 
cultural and historical ambiguity marked 
but not dominated by alternating phases 
of Russification, Finnishisation and So-
vietisation (cf. Scott 2013). The Karelia 
Question thus becomes less of a question 
and, at least until 2014 when the crisis in 
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Ukraine again changed the rhetoric, ap-
parent changes in both the high and low 
geopolitical context have borne witness 
to gestures of Finnish–Russian reconcili-
ation rather than to ideological assess-
ments of regional history. 
Especially important here is the ap-
parent acceptance of the loss of Karelia 
and the resulting acquirement of a more 
polyvalent perspective, acknowledging 
not only various personal reflections but 
also the more relational nature of space. 
This is to say that while the symbolic if 
not mythical role Karelia plays for many 
Finns remains, its understanding is no 
longer necessarily tied to a specific ter-
ritory. Indeed, confronted with the eco-
nomic and social realities of the region it 
seems that the value of Karelia for Finn-
ish national identity has, for many, shifted 
from its location to its status as a mythi-
cal and fantastical construct whose actual 
location and bordering are largely irrel-
evant (Harle & Moisio 2000, p. 115–117; 
Browning & Joenniemi 2014, p. 23; cf. 
Minkkinen 2012).
The material we have analysed sug-
gests that Karelia’s meaning has evolved 
from a concrete geographical place to a 
more nebulous mythical region, if not a 
state of mind, discussion of which now 
serves a therapeutic function more than 
anything else. The number of people with 
personal reminiscences of lost Karelia 
has diminished. Accordingly, what were 
golden memories for some have increas-
ingly been replaced by more negative per-
ceptions of the border region as a locus 
of crime, vodka and sex tourism, human 
trafficking, and other social problems. 
Nevertheless, Karelia remains a matter of 
debate, but the existential Karelia Ques-
tion is now far less of a question; it has be-
come one issue among many others and 
the tone in which it is now discussed and 
written about has become more neutral.
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Peзюме
Джасси П. Лейн, Мартин ван дер Вельде
Карелия и Россия в финском общественном сознании
В статье на основе данных ведущей финской ежедневной 
газеты Helsingin Sanomatdie/Хельсинские новости рассма-
тривается отношение финнов к России. Это касается осо-
бенно так называемого Карельского вопроса и того, каким 
образом это повлияло на общественные дебаты в Финлян-
дии. В статье предпринята попытка изучения влияющих 
на общественное мнение поведенческих моделей в кон-
кретных социальных и культурных условиях и трактуется 
формирование общественного мнения как социального 
поведения. При этом общественное мнение оценивается 
по письмам читателей данной газеты с учётом основных 
произошедших на границе изменений. В течение времени 
здесь имеются отчётливые количественные и качествен-
ные тенденции. Наряду с общим низходящим трендом, 
можно говорить о периодически возникающем эффекте 
и взаимодействии между двусторонними отношениями и 
общими геополитическими изменениями.
Карельский вопрос; общественное мнение; ежедневная га-
зета; Финляндия; Россия; социосемиотика
Résumé
Jussi P. Laine et Martin van der Velde
Spirituellement nôtre, factuellement vôtre: Carélie et la 
Russie dans la conscience publique finlandaise
Basé sur une analyse du principal quotidien finlandais, Helsin-
gin Sanomat, cet article explore le comportement et la percep-
tion qu’ont les Finlandais de la Russie. Il accorde une attention 
particulière à la question dite de la Carélie et comment elle a 
influé sur le discours public en Finlande. L’article vise à enquê-
ter sur les pratiques humaines significatives en fonction des 
circonstances sociales et culturelles spécifiques à la région et 
explique que le fait de donner du sens est une pratique sociale. 
Il évalue la manière dont l’opinion publique, telle qu’expri-
mée dans la page des courriers du journal, a évolué et a été 
influencée par les changements importants qui ont eu lieu à la 
frontière. Des changements clairs, aussi bien quantitatifs que 
qualitatifs, ont eu lieu au fil du temps. Ils peuvent être résumés 
comme représentant une tendance de passage général dans 
l’histoire, mais aussi comme un effet plus cyclique et comme 
l’interaction entre relations bilatérales et changements géopo-
litiques plus importants. 
Question Carélie; opinion publique; quotidien; Finlande; Russie; 
sémiotique sociale
